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POST-EARTHQUAKE LEGAL REFORM
IN HAITI: IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR
Leonard L. Cavise
INTRODUCTION

T

he old European way of trying criminal cases, the socalled inquisitorial system, is dying. Throughout Latin
America, countries have passed new codes of criminal procedure that have adopted the party system, similar to the accusatorial system in the United States. Even in Europe, lawyers
and lawmakers are advocating for a more open and adversarial
system. They have managed to enact new legislation calling, at
least, for an end to the secrecy of the old procedures, a greater
role for lawyers, and a more oral and public system for trying
cases.1 Most dramatically, in France, the birthplace of the European model, President Sarkozy, in 2009, called to replace the
centerpiece of the inquisitorial system, the juge d’instruction,
with a more party-oriented judge and to transfer the duties of
investigation to the public prosecutor.2 Considering that Napo

Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Public Interest Law and
Interim Director of the International Human Rights Law Institute at the
DePaul College of Law. I wish to thank the International Senior Lawyers
Project for involving me in Haiti’s criminal justice reform project. Please note
that to the extent this Article includes un-cited assertions, I have made my
inferences based on my participation in, and materials and notes from, the
conferences to reform the Haitian Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
Codes.
1. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 26–29 (2004); to understand the complexities of the Italian experience, see Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System
Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
489, 489, 492–95 (2004).
2. At a session before the Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, Sarkozy said: “Le juge d’instruction en la forme actuelle ne peut être arbitre. Il
est donc temps que le juge d’instruction cède la place à un juge de
l’instruction qui contrôlera le déroulement de l’enquête mais ne la dirigera
plus.” (The committing magistrate in its present form can only be a referee. It
is therefore time that the committing magistrate cedes his position to the
juge de l’instruction who will guide the progress of the inquiry but will not
direct it.) Sarkozy confirme la fin du juge d’instruction [Sarkozy Confirms the
End of the Committing Magistrate], LIBÉRATION, Jan. 7, 2009,
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101310147-sarkozy-veut-supprimer-le-juge-
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leon birthed the inquisitorial system in France in 1808, it is
significant that a French President himself is calling for such a
major reform. The inquisitorial system appears to be in its
death throes.
In 2008, President René Préval of the Republic of Haiti appointed two commissions (“the Commissions”) to revise the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Haiti. The Codes had not
been revised since 1835, when the Republic was just getting on
its feet after the slave rebellion of 1803. Both the substantive
and the procedural codes were drawn from the codes of France,
then known, of course, as the Napoleonic Codes. They reflected
the inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which centers
around the juge d’instruction.
By the time of President Préval’s decision in 2008, Haiti was
already well behind in the Latin American movement to transition its criminal justice systems from the inquisitorial to the
accusatorial or adversarial model. As part of that movement,
and encouragement via foreign aid from the United States,
over twenty nations recodified their law and procedure, hoping
to modernize the system, minimize the endemic weaknesses of
the European model, and to attract foreign investment by
providing a more predictable legal environment.3
President Préval named René Magloire, a former Minister of
Justice, as chair of the Haitian Commissions.4 Magloire, partly
because of his two terms as Minister of Justice, is a very well
known legal personality in Haiti and a close friend of Préval’s.
It was Magloire’s task to not only draft the new Codes but also
to convince the practicing bar, which was heavily influenced by
the French model, and the larger society to accept these reforms as a part of Haiti’s ongoing attempts to launch a functioning criminal justice system.
The challenges of such a reform were overwhelming in view
of Haiti’s daunting lack of resources, pervasive corruption,
d-instruction (Fr.). See also, Alain Salles, M. Sarkozy envisage de supprimer
le juge d’instruction [Mr. Sarkozy Considers Eliminating the Committing
Magistrate],
LE
MONDE,
Jan.
6,
2009,
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/01/06/m-sarkozy-envisage-desupprimer-le-juge-d-instruction_1138259_823448.html (Fr.).
3. Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure:
Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 630–31
(2007).
4. The Haitian Commissions consist of the Commission to Reform the
Criminal Procedure Law of the Republic of Haiti and the Commission to Reform the Criminal Law of the Republic of Haiti.
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their history of impunity in police conduct,5 and the resistance
of the more traditional Francophiles and others invested in the
maintenance of the present system. Additionally, the catastrophic earthquake in 2010 devastated Haiti, particularly the
capital, Port-au-Prince, and caused the death of a number of
the important players in the reform project.6 Almost miraculously, the project continued with the completion—an implausible three weeks after the earthquake—of another draft of the
procedural Code and with the convening of the next international conference of the Commissions a mere two months later.
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the general historical and political antecedents to this reform initiative, including
several of the previous projects to strengthen and solidify the
Haitian criminal justice system. Part II will describe the Haitian criminal justice system as it presently exists, including its
perceived deficiencies, as background to this law reform process. Part III will describe the reform process as the author
viewed it. This description will touch upon the key elements of
the discussion and the attempt by the Commissions and its invited guests to adopt the essence of the party system while
adapting it to the legal cultural life of Haiti. Part IV describes
the influence of the French in Haiti today and the effects of
that influence on the reform process. Part V describes the historic first conference and the divergency of views on the necessity and direction of procedural reform. In Part VI, a description of the content of the new Haitian Criminal Law and Procedure Codes is begun with an exposition of the human rights
preamble to the Criminal Procedure Code, which is key to public acceptance of the Codes. That preamble and the human
rights provisions in other parts of the procedural Code are interesting particularly for the international norms adopted and
the preservation of some traditional Haitian values. Part VII
discusses other key procedural Code provisions, beginning with
5. Impunity refers generally to what Americans would call the arbitrary
or capricious use of power without due process.
6. Particularly noteworthy, in this regard, is the death of Micha Gaillard,
the Chair of the public advocate’s portion of the Commission. José de Córdoba, Micha Gaillard, Fought for Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703822404575019190559786
092.html.
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components of the accusatorial or party system that were rejected. In Part VIII, the accusatorial features that are accepted,
in whole or in part, are outlined. Part IX describes possible infrastructure reform that will be necessary to implement the full
slate of proposed reforms, along with, in Part X, an assessment
as to what must happen in Haiti to develop a social consensus
and thereby implement this dramatic transition. The Article
concludes that, despite the assistance from foreign resources
and the hard work and dedication of a cadre of lawyers and
their allies, the development of a new criminal procedure system can only be realized with the development of democratic
institutions in the country as a whole.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Haiti had not written a new criminal code for substantive law
or procedure since the Criminal Codes of 1835.7 Various new
crimes, such as crimes outlawing forced labor and anti-drug
trafficking laws, have been inserted into the existing Codes
since then,8 but there has never been a comprehensive revision,
which is particularly remarkable in a code-based legal system.
It is estimated that fully 165 legal or administrative provisions

7. CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.C.] (Haiti), translated in
GENDARMERIE TRANSLATION OF THE CODE PÉNAL AND THE CODE D’INSTRUCTION
CRIMINELLE (1922).
8. Many supplemental laws to the criminal code were passed by executive
order rather than passing through parliament. Aside from the highly irregular nature of these laws, many of them are unknown even to the legal community. Some of these additional laws were introduced by the “Decret du 7
avril 1982” which is an attempt to harmonize Haitian law with various international conventions and treaties that the Government of Haiti had signed or
to change some legal definitions, e.g., the definition of rape. Décret du 7 avril
1982 harmonisant la Législation pénale en vigueur avec les Conventions Internationales signées et ratifiées par le Gouvernement Haïtien [Decree Harmonizing the Penal Code with International Conventions Signed and Ratified
by the Haitian Government], in ORG. AM. STATES, L’Entraide Judiciaire en
Matière Pénale et d’Extradition [Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
and
Extradition],
http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/fr/hti/fr_hti_penal.html#_Toc37077164. See
HANS JOERG ALBRECHT, LOUIS AUCOIN & VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI: NEW LAWS FOR A
NEW ERA 2 (2009); see also Décret du 6 juillet 2005 modifiant le régime des
Agressions Sexuelles et éliminant en la matière les Discriminations contre la
Femme [Decree Modifying Rape and Eliminating Discrimination Against
Women], in LE MONITEUR (Haiti), Aug. 11, 2005, at 1–6.
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in the Codes are no longer relevant in the modern era.9 New
codes were passed, by contrast, in other legal disciplines such
as the Labor Law in 1961, the Rural Code in 1962, and the
Code of Civil Procedure in 1963.10
The Criminal Codes of 1835 were based entirely on the
French system of law drafted in France between 1804 and
1812.11 Known as the inquisitorial system, the French system
features the key role of the investigating judge, the juge
d’instruction, and lesser roles for the attorneys. The inquisitorial system has a long investigatory phase that is closed to the
parties and the public. The juge d’instruction is charged with
not only investigating, but also evaluating and judging the
case. Oral trials were not conducted nor was there provision for
any oral proceedings. The role of lawyers was normally confined to arguments at a proceeding that most resembles sentencing in the American system. Appeal is de novo. The victim
is a full party, entitled to the same participation as the other
two parties. The dossier used by the judge to investigate is
commonly replete with second and third party statements rather than statements from persons with personal knowledge.12
Many European countries and virtually all of the countries of
Latin America mimicked the French system and adopted what
was commonly called the Napoleonic Code for their criminal
justice systems. Over time, the structural weaknesses of the
French system became more apparent, and critics decried the
extended delays, the secrecy of proceedings, the lack of advocacy during the guilt-innocence phase, prolonged pretrial detention, lack of confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses,
and lack of written decisions based upon a record. Added to
that were the additional dysfunctions of impunity, police cor9. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, KEEPING HAITI SAFE: JUSTICE REFORM 10 (2011)
[hereinafter KEEPING HAITI SAFE].
10. See Marisol Florén-Romero, Researching Haitian Law, GLOBALEX
(May/June 2008), http://nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Haiti.htm.
11. Haiti, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC
LEGISLATION
IN
JURISDICTIONS
OF
THE
WORLD,
http://www.foreignlawguide.com/ip/flg/Haiti.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
12. RICHARD VOGLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, in COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14, 19–21 (noting that the dossier must contain “all
available evidence”). For a more complete treatment of the traditional French
inquisitorial system, see id. at 14–95.
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ruption, and long post-trial sentences in depraved prison conditions, adding impetus to reform movements, first in Europe
and then elsewhere.13
Though many countries considered modernizing or transitioning their criminal systems to the accusatorial model, a reform movement did not take hold in Latin America until the
1980s. In the following twenty years, over half of the nations of
Latin America managed at least to pass new codes of criminal
law and procedure, which reflected the accusatorial or “party”
model of criminal justice.14 Though there is only basic similarity in the codes adopted, the principal features of this system,
familiar to American trial lawyers, are generally included in
the codes of the transition states. Those features include oral
and public trials, control by the parties of the evidence and
witnesses presented, party control of the investigation, prosecutorial control of the police, prosecutorial discretion in charging and dismissing decisions, a judge or jury verdict, rules of
evidence that exclude hearsay and prejudicial information, and
the power of the parties to plea bargain.
Many of the law reforms were not complete transitions to the
adversarial model, but rather to a hybrid system. Adapting the
adversarial model to their local conditions, some states rejected
key important American trial features such as the jury, plea
bargaining, the reduced role of the victim at trial, and appeals
restricted to questions of law.15 However, many reformers had
seen the elements of open and adversarial hearings, public trials, power in the prosecutor to bring and dismiss charges, party
presentation of witnesses and evidence, and prosecutorial control of the investigating police as key components of the transition. Other key elements of the party system, plea bargaining
13. MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES 11–13, 18–27 (2002).
14. Maximo Langer, supra note 3, at 670; Leonard L. Cavise, The Transition from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why
Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 785, 785 n.1
(2007).
15. For a collection of research and reports by the Centro de Estudios de la
Justicia de Las Americas (“CEJA”) on various Latin countries see CENTRO DE
ESTUDIOS DE JUSTICIA DE LAS AMÉRICAS [JUSTICE STUDIES CENTER OF THE
AMERICAS],
http://www.cejamericas.org/index.php/areas-detrabajo/evaluacion-y-seguimiento-de-las-reformas-penales/reformas-a-lajusticia-penal (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). For a treatment of Mexico’s new
hybrid system, see William Hine-Ramsberger, Drug Violence and Constitutional Revisions: Mexico’s 2008 Criminal Justice Reform and the Formation of
the Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 291–317 (2011).
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in particular, have been subjected to much closer scrutiny and
remain part of the continuing dialogue.
Many of the reforms have not yet been realized because most
countries are still in the implementation phase. Finding the
resources to train police, prosecutors, defenders, judges, court
personnel and prison administrators is, in many cases, an imponderable undertaking. Changing the culture of how cases are
litigated or, more precisely, imposing a party superstructure on
a civil law foundation requires extensive training. Additionally,
maintaining the political will to continue with the transition
will vary with the changing political atmospheres in each country. In Italy, for example, there have been at least three “restorations” of prior procedure by the Corte di Cassazione,16 and at
least one “counter-reaction” by a Parliament intent on institutionalizing the new reforms.17
II. BACKGROUND OF THE HAITI PROJECT
In 1993, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, twice president of Haiti,
wrote:
The need for a judicial system that will bring [human rights
abusers] to justice is the major concern, the major desire, and
the major issue for most Haitians. We need to see that justice
is done and that those who have committed such heinous
crimes – crimes against humanity – will be brought to justice.18

Aristide was speaking of a justice system that, aside from
and beyond its treatment of crimes against humanity, was
simply dysfunctional.19 Arbitrary arrest and prolonged deten16. Luca Marafioti, Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between
Two Traditions, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMAŠKA
81, 91–93 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008).
17. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an
Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 431–32 (2004).
18. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The Role of the Judiciary in the Transition to
Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY 35, 36 (1993).
19. Haiti’s criminal justice system and its continual violation of human
rights have been documented in a number of reports. See, e.g., Alternative
Chance, et al., Criminal Justice, in UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, REPUBLIC OF
HAITI: SUBMISSIONS TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 26 (2011).
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tion,20 torture and summary execution, impunity in prosecutions, corruption,21 secrecy, unending delay, lack of counsel, incompetent judges, total lack of confrontation, inhumane prison
conditions22—all of these were but the first glimpse of the profound dysfunction that had become, over many years, the Haitian criminal justice system. Additionally, murder and torture
by government-employed predators, the Duvaliers’ army
known as the Tonton Macoutes, were commonplace during the
many years of the Duvalier dictatorships.23 When, in 1991,
there was a coup d’état overthrowing the very popular Presi-

20. See generally Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in
Haiti, Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/35 (Apr. 23, 2012) (by Michel Forst). Prior to
the 2010 earthquake, almost 80% of all inmates in Haiti were pretrial detainees. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, COUNTRY SUMMARY: HAITI 2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/haiti_1.pdf. Despite a
Constitutional provision that arrestees can be held only for forty-eight hours
before seeing a judge, most inmates had never seen a judge. In reality, defendants in 2010 spent an average of 408 days in pretrial detention. Id. at 5.
21. Corruption in the judiciary contributes mightily to prolonged pretrial
detention, involving prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges, all of whom
extort money. GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, ACTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI: IMMEDIATE KEY INITIATIVES FOR THE
FUTURE
45
(2010),
available
at
http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/Haiti%20Action%20Plan%20%2
8English%20version%29.pdf [hereinafter HAITI, ACTION PLAN].
22. It should be noted that, after the January 2010 earthquake, all of the
5400 prisoners in the Civil Penitentiary, the largest penitentiary in Port-auPrince, escaped. Eight months later, only 629 had been recaptured. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: HAITI (2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/haiti_1.pdf. At least
one commentator has called the conditions in Haitian prisons “the worst in
the world.” Kate Heartfield, Hell is a Haitian Prison, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Can.),
June
4,
2009,
available
at
http://www2.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=e3a6275b-b474-4a328149-129177f4571c&sponsor=. The U.N. Rule of Law Indicators Project noted
that “all of Haiti’s prisons were overcrowded prior to the earthquake. According to the report prior to the earthquake: ‘[T]he least crowded prison, in Les
Coteaux, is at 230% of official capacity and the most crowded facility (Hinche)
holds more than ten times the number it was designed to hold.’” Christopher
Stone, A New Era for Justice Sector Reform in Haiti 10 (Harvard Kennedy
Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP10-033, 2010), available at
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4448872.
23. Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc”
Duvalier ruled the country continuously from 1957 to 1986. See generally
Sophia Asare, “This Land Cannot Die”: U.S. Involvement in the Rebuilding
Haiti, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 177, 183–86 (2010).
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dent Aristide, leading to a three-year reign of terror, the situation reached a new low:
The law has been used to reify and reinforce the domination
of a small elite over the great mass of poor peasants and
workers, and has almost never functioned to punish even in
the case of the worst massacres. Even when dictatorial leaders have been overthrown, they have usually been allowed to
leave the country to join their bank accounts. As a result, the
Haitian poor justifiably have little faith in the Haitian state
in general and the legal system in particular.24

As Haiti struggles now from dictatorship toward a distant
form of representative democracy, the threat of a return to authoritarian rule is always present, particularly in the face of
starvation and an ineffective government. As Haiti’s drama unfolds, the question remains whether the judiciary and the criminal justice system can play a role in regaining the path to development and responsive government. Foreign experts regularly ask whether there can ever be rule of law in a country
that has so little tradition of democracy and has not internalized the importance of the rule of law and the legitimacy of a
reformed criminal justice system.25 There is no easy response.
The overwhelming problems in Haiti’s justice sector have not
escaped international notice. In 2006, the World Bank identified long delays in the criminal justice system caused by “communication failures between the investigative ‘judicial’ police
and prosecutors on evidence-gathering and the preparation of
cases, inadequate tracking and management of case files by
court clerks, and deficient enforcement of judicial orders for
prisoner transfers and release.”26 The treatment plan, however,
concluded that reforms cannot be solely focused on “technical
capacity building, training, and infrastructure, but instead
must be integrated into a broader process of state building and
24. Reed Brody, International Aspects of Current Efforts at Judicial Reform: Undermining Justice in Haiti, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE
UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 227, 228 (1999).
25. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Indispensable State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201,
210 (2003).
26. CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MANAGEMENT UNIT, WORLD BANK, SOCIAL
RESILIENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY IN HAITI: A COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS 55
(2006).
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democratic consolidation. . . . The creation of a national constituency in favor of reform is essential to furthering change in
the police and justice system.”27 This conclusion came after a
lengthy description of failed reform efforts from international
donors28 and the “paralysis of disorganization” and dysfunction
of the Ministry of Justice.29 Most Haitians have felt excluded
from even having the right to petition the courts,30 unlike the
high privilege accorded to violent gang leaders31 who not only
had access to the courts but also to the defense lawyers. Members of the bar available to the indigent are few and far between.32
In 2005, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) reported that Haiti’s longstanding problems would
not change without “urgent reforms to strengthen the administration of justice and the rule of law in Haiti.”33 The IACHR’s
analysis of the court system found that many of the laws were
outdated, that there was a lack of effective access to legal assistance, and that the police failed to execute judicial orders.
These failures resulted in 85% to 90% of all criminally-accused
being held in pretrial detention for long periods of time, pervasive and prolonged pretrial delay, and widespread impunity for
state actors.34 Conclusions like these are commonplace. The
IACHR singled out a number of cases, highlighting in particular the removal, on December 9, 2005, of five judges of Haiti’s
Supreme Court by the then-interim President Boniface Alexandre, who replaced them with five judges of his own choosing
apparently without constitutional authority. 35 The IACHR investigators discovered further dysfunction in the legal system
27. Id. at 58.
28. Id. at 53. Both Haitians and international human rights groups have
criticized some of the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and its contracting agencies for projects drawn with little or
no input from local actors or for failure to attend Haitian-led programs. Brody, supra note 24, at 234.
29. CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MANAGEMENT UNIT, supra note 26, at 54.
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 54. A notable exception is the Institute for Democracy in Haiti,
which has staff lawyers available to the indigent.
33. Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Haiti: Failed
Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International
Community, at v, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.123 (October 26, 2005) [hereinafter Haiti:
Failed Justice?].
34. Id. at vi.
35. Id. at 15–16.
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when they found that, in 2004, an appallingly low total of only
six trials were scheduled in the entire country. Of the six, one
was not heard because the file was not sufficiently prepared;
another was not heard because the defendant had escaped from
prison. The court heard three trials in absentia because the defendants had escaped, and one trial resulted in acquittal for the
co-defendants due to lack of evidence. In that case, the defendants were former leaders of the paramilitary group Front for
the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (“FRAPH”), who were
widely known as the Duvaliers’ “death squad” torturers and
executioners.36 The IACHR ultimately concluded, based upon
general agreement both internationally and in Haiti specifically, that there should be a comprehensive redesign and reform
of the country’s criminal laws.37
In November 2007, the Haitian Government itself issued a
“Growth and Poverty Reduction” Strategy Paper designed to
articulate a vision to “lift Haiti out of poverty and destitution.”38 In Chapter 7, the government outlined the weaknesses
in the justice system, such as “executive branch interference in
the exercise of judicial authority,” corruption, impunity, organized crime, the public’s inability to understand or trust the
legal system, long delays, practically nonexistent maintenance
of criminal records, “arbitrary and abusive” preventive detention, appalling prison conditions, and the overall lack of training or adequate salaries.39 The document was dedicated to the
establishment of an “equitable legal order, a functional judicial
system, and a general climate of security . . .” wherein justice
would be “accessible,” “credible,” “independent,” and “efficient.”40
36. Id. at 71–72.
37. Id. at 73.
38. MINISTÈRE DE LA PLANIFICATION ET DE LA COOPÉRATION EXTERNE
[MPCE], DOCUMENT DE STRATÉGIE NATIONALE POUR LA CROISSANCE ET LA
RÉDUCTION DE LA PAUVRETÉ [DSNCRP] (2008–2010): POUR RÉUSSIR LE SAUT
QUALITATIF [GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER] 14–16 (2007)
(Haiti). The paper was actually first issued in July 2006 for the International
Conference on Economic and Social Development, which was held in Haiti.
Though the document comprehensively reviewed the poverty and underdevelopment in Haiti, only its justice sector reforms are discussed here.
39. Haiti: Failed Justice?, supra note 33, at 77.
40. Id. at 77–79.
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A principal target of the justice sector reform, as set forth in
the Strategy Paper, was the modernization of legislation
through the adoption of specific and targeted changes in the
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedures Code.41 This mandate
posed the question of whether the present system should be
reformed or whether it should be discarded in favor of a complete transition to the accusatorial model. States in transition
commonly deal with this question, as each country seeks to
minimize the trauma to the established legal order. Several
international non-governmental organizations have attempted
small reforms in Haiti. “Judicial strengthening” is a typical reform that sends many of the legal players to a variety of training seminars but seldom results in any basic changes.42 This is
not to say that many judges, prosecutors, and police have not
benefited from the training exercises. However, very few of the
training sessions have convinced the majority of people that
anything has changed or that the legal system is any more conscious of due process or human rights than it ever was. It was
therefore determined that a group of changes embracing both
the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems should be attempted.
III. THE HAITI LAW REFORM PROJECT
In 2009, René Magloire, chair of the Commissions to reform
the Criminal Law and Procedure Codes, invited the author to
serve as Senior Advisor to the Commissions to aid in the drafting, codification, and implementation processes. As a French
speaker experienced in preparing lawyers and judges for the
transition from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial model,43 the
author traveled to Haiti in May 2009. The two Commissions
were comprised of the principal players in the reform process,
including the dean of the largest law school, the vice-president
of the highest court (“Cour de cassation”), the Minister of Justice, and the head of the Justice Section of MINUSTAH,44 the
much-criticized U.N. peacekeeping force in Haiti.
41. Id. at 80.
42. Stotzky, The Indispensable State, supra note 25, at 242.
43. For a full exposition see Cavise, supra note 14, at 787–93.
44. Facts and Figures, UNITED NATIONS STABILISATION MISSION IN HAITI
[MINUSTAH], www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml.
For a recitation of some of the more common criticisms of MINUSTAH, see
HEALTHROOTS STUDENT ORG., HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, MINUSTAH:
KEEPING THE PEACE, OR CONSPIRING AGAINST IT?: A REVIEW OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS RECORD OF THE UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI 1
(Oct.
2011),
available
at

2013]

LEGAL REFORM IN HAITI

891

The establishment of two separate Commissions, for the substantive criminal law and another for the criminal procedure
law, may have been unnecessary. The procedural transformation is a more complex and controversial undertaking, although the substantive criminal Code does require some modernization and integration. However, the Haitian criminal
Code has adapted somewhat to the modern era by codifying
new crimes.45 Procedural transition, on the other hand, would
have a more dramatic societal impact. The Commissions, composed of lawyers, criminologists, and sociologists, were particularly well-situated to avoid the political turf questions that
have plagued other transitions from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial system. No member of either Commission held political or governmental office. Nonetheless, the power of the
Commissions was unquestioned due to the presidential mandate and Magloire’s status not only as a former and very well
known Minister of Justice, but also as a close advisor to President Préval.
Magloire intended to plan for an international workshop on
Haiti’s transition in Port-au-Prince in June 2009, a month after
the author’s initial visit. The workshop would unveil the reform
project and act as an initial exposition of the accusatorial model of criminal law. Magloire had planned for several prominent
protagonists, whether Haitian or foreign lawyers, to demonstrate the advantages of the party model. The Commissions
http://www.tanbou.com/2011/fall/MINUSTAHWhitePaper.pdf. More recently,
MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been blamed by some for the introduction of
cholera into Haiti which, to date, has resulted in the deaths of over 7000 Haitians. Nepalese soldiers working for the U.N. peacekeepers were allegedly
contaminated upon their arrival in Haiti and, thereafter, there were inadequate sanitation facilities in their encampment. Jane Chong & Muneer I.
Ahmad, YaleOpEd: Haiti, Cholera and the U.N., MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 30,
2012), available at http://www.ijdh.org/yale-oped-haiti-cholera-and-the-u-nby-miami-herald/#.UWBFHJOG2So. Lawyers for the Institute for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti have filed petitions with the U.N. organizations seeking
damages. See Matthew Mosk & Rym Momtaz, Report: UN Peacekeepers
Caused Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011) available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/report-caused-cholerahaiti/story?id=14904474#.UWBnoZOG2Sr.
45. ALBRECHT, AUCOIN & O’CONNOR, supra note 8, at 2–4. Another problem, however, is that many unmodified portions of the criminal law are unclear or completely outdated.
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hoped to convince the attendees that joining the reform movement, already underway in many Latin American countries,
would serve Haiti best. The Commissions also hoped that the
June conference would unite all the interested national and
international parties around addressing several key questions:
(1) the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Code reforms, (2)
the substance of various actual Code provisions, (3) the process
of reform of the Codes, and (4) the implementation issues to
expect.
Planning also focused on anticipated obstacles to reform, including jurists who may be hesitant to adopt the accusatorial
model or who may prefer small-scale modifications to “Grand
Reform.” This has never been an easy question to resolve. The
United States, which is the principal employer of the party
model, has a number of very strong cultural differences with all
of the countries transitioning, and a widely-displayed number
of criminal procedure structures that have, in practice, collapsed into virtual dysfunction. The American plea bargaining
system, always viewed with suspicion internationally as akin
to a business negotiation, is all the more unattractive when it
is learned that fully 95% of all federal criminal dispositions are
by guilty plea,46 that people are allowed to plead guilty even
though they maintain their innocence,47 and that defendants
can be threatened with increased charges if they refuse to
plead guilty.48 Internationally, including in Haiti, the pervasiveness and perceived unfairness of the guilty plea in the
American system is seen as a systemic expedient rather than a
proper resolution of a criminal case based upon guilt or innocence.
One important cultural difference is the jury. Most Latin
countries have rejected the jury as the arbiter of the facts for a
variety of reasons.49 The lack of a jury tradition is probably the
principal reason for hesitation but an underlying bias is the
46. Frye v. Missouri, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012).
47. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1970).
48. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
49. There are exceptions. Argentina, for example, tries most felony cases
before a mixed panel composed of judges and laypersons. LUCIANO A. HAZAN Y
ALAN IUD, CEJA, INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN DEL PROCESO DE FORTALECIMIENTO
DEL SISTEMA ACUSATORIO EN LA PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES – PLAN DE
FLAGRANCIA [ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE STRENGTHENING PROCESS OF THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES – PLAN FRAGRANCY]
(2008); see also Edmundo Hendler, Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent Experience, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 13–14 (2008–2009).
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often-encountered feeling that the citizen of Latin countries or
Haiti are simply unprepared to assume the responsibilities of
being a juror: to impartially receive, understand, and review
the evidence and to pronounce a verdict, even if that verdict is
against the prosecutor and the police who represent the government. The history of repression in many of these countries
has been so strong that the average citizen will still hesitate to
contradict the wishes of the representatives of the government.
On a more philosophical plane, there is resistance to the confrontational and, as perceived, overly adversarial nature of the
accusatorial common-law system. A basic trust in the truthseeking ability of the single judge survives even in countries
where abuses abound.50 When the advocates prepare the trial,
compiling proof (a more quantitative goal) is seen as more important than the evaluation of that proof (the qualitative goal).
Freiberg points out that, too often in the adversarial system,
cases are presented to courts as “disputes” and trials are regarded as contests of opposing interests—confrontational and
antagonistic. The emphasis is not on finding the truth but rather on destroying the other side’s version.51 Defense attorneys
instruct their clients to “deny everything” and make the prosecution prove its case rather than to accept responsibility where
appropriate and perhaps even show contrition. This domination
of the system by a sense of adversarialism has led several
countries to seek out alternative dispute resolution models that
encompass some degree of compromise, mediation, and acceptance of responsibility. This is particularly true in countries
where the state apparatus has very high legitimacy and trustworthiness, such as in the Nordic countries.52
For reasons such as this, a number of European and Latin
countries have opted for what they call a “mixed” or “hybrid”
system, which normally lies somewhere between the inquisitorial and the accusatorial models.53 It is virtually impossible and
50. Arie Freiberg, Post-Adversarial and Post-Inquisitorial Justice: Transcending Traditional Penological Paradigms, 8 EUR. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 82, 83–
84 (2011).
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 85.
53. For a cataloging of differences and similarities see DELMAS-MARTY &
SPENCER, supra note 13, at 27–32.
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indeed ill-advised to consider whether to adopt the “pure” or
the “mixed” as a matter of principal. These reforms should be
discussed one by one and, in most circumstances, results will
be considered “hybrid” even if the country adopts the key constructs of the accusatorial model. Once a country decides to retire the judge of instruction as the investigator, caller of witnesses, evaluator of the evidence, and final judge, it has already prepared the way for the party model. Once the criminal
case has been turned over to the parties for an oral and open
hearing with live witnesses and cross-examination, the essence
of the party system has been adopted. Transferring power from
the judge to the prosecutor is an impactful reform, given that
the prosecutor will control the investigating police, the charging decision, the investigation itself, and the state’s presentation of evidence. In the absence of a functioning criminal defense bar, particularly for the overwhelming numbers of indigent defendants, the balance of power between the parties will
be tilted dramatically towards the prosecution, at least until
public defender offices can be funded, and the attorneys
trained. This transference of power from the judge to the prosecutor is obvious to the Haitian criminal lawyers and, as will be
seen, results in serious doubts for some about the entire transition.
The author’s task, at this early stage, was to outline the principal points for discussion in both the plenary session and the
small working groups at the June conference, focusing on the
practical differences—such as the role of the prosecutor—in order to draw out the philosophical differences. The field from
which to propose questions, both practical and philosophical, is
very rich. The accusatorial system differs dramatically from
the inquisitorial system in well over twenty respects. Even if
one is convinced that a transition should occur in the key ways
previously mentioned, such as turning over the proceedings to
counsel, conducting open and oral hearings, developing a
strong defense, and changing the judge’s role to that of an arbiter mainly of questions of law, it does not necessarily follow
that each of the other ancillary changes often discussed should
be adopted in all cases. Experiences in other countries have
shown which parts of the transition would be the most difficult
to accept, certainly at this early stage. Nonetheless, foreigners
placed in the role of experts in the design and implementation
of justice projects such as this one should proceed cautiously to
avoid being impatient, judgmental, or over-bearing. Allegiance
to the accusatorial system, particularly common among Ameri-
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cans, can lead to biases and assumptions that are unhelpful in
this context. All too often, small groups of foreign experts have
developed codes in consultation with a discreet number of government officials, but virtually no consultation with the remainder of the bar or other parts of civil society.54 Fortunately,
Magloire was also very sensitive to that problem. After much
discussion, it was determined that the working groups at the
first conference should concentrate on the following issues:
1) Whether to maintain the juge d’instruction or to adopt
President Sarkozy’s formulation of the juge de l’instruction,
which, despite seeming to be almost exactly the same appellation, provides for a judiciary more akin to that of the party
system, a referee between the parties as they present evidence;
2) Whether to give the prosecutor control of the judicial police;
3) Whether to implement the concept of l’egalité d’armes,
which contemplates a considerable expansion of the role of
the defense counsel to bring the defense into an equal position
with the prosecution, at least at trial, and;
4) How to set and enforce time limits in regards to the rights
to a speedy trial, and to be free from unnecessary preventive
detention.55

If time permitted, the working groups would also consider the
role of the victim,56 training and jurisdiction of justices of the
peace, oral presentation of evidence in general,57 and plea bargaining.58 This list of topics did not touch upon many smaller
54. Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old
Issues in Justice Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 45 (2001).
55. Conference notes on file with author.
56. In most traditional European systems, the victim is a full party to the
proceeding, with rights to call witnesses, argue, contest legal rulings, and
appeal. See infra text accompanying notes 78–80.
57. One of the major hesitations about oral witness examination is the
suggestiveness and aggressiveness of cross-examination. See Cavise, supra
note 14, at 804–05.
58. Transition countries have developed a variety of ways of adopting some
form of plea bargaining without opting into the purely American model. The
widely held perception is that, in the United States, some defendants will
plead guilty without actually being guilty because of the pressure brought to
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sub-issues, including the principle of opportunité,59 various
burdens of proof, whether the invocation of the right to silence
can give rise to negative inferences, and reform of law school
curricula and teaching methods. Again, the field from which to
draw is infinite.
Most of the roadblocks to a wholesale reformation of the criminal justice system encountered at the conference were entirely
foreseeable. Primarily, and always a concern in Haiti, the problem of financing the transition. How can Haitians persuade
foreign donors to finance the law reform project when Haiti has
so many other “survival” issues to face? That question remains
unanswered today. How, and in which jurisdiction, to conduct
training is another major concern.60 This question brings into
play the predictable turf issues, which also remain largely undecided. How can the reformers educate the public to boost
popular confidence in the justice system? How can this project
be coordinated with prison reform and judicial administration
initiatives? The questions are numerous, but one formidable
but unspoken obstacle was the resistance of the French and the
Francophiles to the transition.
IV. THE HISTORY OF FRANCO-HAITIAN RELATIONS
A very short look at historical Franco-Haitian relations may
be useful. The French have, of course, the longest history in
Haiti. French rule began in 1660 after the Spanish decided to
concentrate on what has become the Dominican Republic. The
Spanish formally ceded the western half of the island to the
French in 1697.61 By the 1780s, the French colony of Saint
bear by the prosecutors. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–
30 (1970). The Italians, for example, have adopted the “summary trial”
which, in most respects, resembles a plea bargain. See Marafioti, supra note
16, at 90.
59. Opportunité refers to the right of the prosecutor to dismiss a criminal
charge without prior consultation with the presiding judge.
60. In the wake of the earthquake, non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) have been very reluctant to turn over dedicated funds to Haitian
government without assurances of when and how the funds will be spent. See
Jake Johnston, Op-Ed., Humanitarian Aid in Haiti: Supply and Demand,
J.
(Dec.
23,
2011,
6:00
AM),
CARIBBEAN
http://www.caribjournal.com/2011/12/23/op-ed-jake-johnston-onhumanitarian-aid-in-haiti-supply-and-demand/.
61. Jalisco Lancer, The Conflict Between Haiti and the Dominican RepubEMPIRES,
lic,
ALL
http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=conflict_haiti_dominican (last
visited May 12, 2013).
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Domingue, from which Haiti emerged, had become a major
producer of coffee and sugar.62 The French imported 790,000
slaves, far more than any other country in the Americas, including the United States, to do the labor. The French also
killed their slaves at the highest rates through generally inhumane treatment.63 The revolt of the slaves began in 1791
and culminated in a full-scale invasion by the armies of Napoleon in 1802. The French suffered enormous losses, and the
former slaves made a final declaration of independence in
1804.64 The French immediately imposed a trade embargo,
which was not lifted until France recognized the independent
republic in 1825 in exchange for a ransom payment of 150 million gold Francs.65
In 1915, Haiti was occupied by U.S. marines sent to protect
U.S. and French interests. The military occupation lasted until
1934 and, thereafter, the United States and France together
supported a considerable number of ruling juntas66 and dictatorships in Haiti.67 In 1986, France granted asylum to Haitian
dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. With the election of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994, and his reelection in 2000, the
people of Haiti indeed had found a popular hero in whom they
were convinced democratic ideals resided. Aristide, however,
was not at all trusted by foreign interests.68 The United States
and France installed World Bank official Gerard Latortue as
prime minister after a 2004 military coup that overthrew Aristide.69 A continuing issue, reiterated by Aristide in 2003, is
Haiti’s demand for $21 billion as restitution for the ransom
62. Irwin Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, 26 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 1, 17–18
(2010).
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 17, 25.
65. Id. at 18.
66. The term “junta” usually refers to a form of non-democratic governance
of a country. Whether it be a military or civilian junta, it usually means governance by a small committee, often leading to dictatorship.
67. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 23–24.
68. See id. at 26–27.
69. Aristide Denies Ties to Violence in Haiti and Calls for Dialogue, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/international/americas/21haiti.html?ref=
gerardlatortue.
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paid to the French for independence.70 It is plain, however,
that, at some point in the latter part of the last century, the
United States took the lead in managing Haiti’s relations with
the rest of the world. Nonetheless, Haitians continue to see
France as a main culprit in the destruction of Haitian democracy. Additionally, France contributes far less foreign aid to
Haiti than Canada, the United States, and the Nordic countries, despite its historical legacy, commonality of language,
and institutional development, including the legal system.71
Despite the lack of the kind of post-colonial foreign aid that is
typical of the “mother country,” France maintains a strong
presence in Haiti and continues to play a role in the nation’s
affairs. In that context, it is not surprising the French would
have strong opinions about the idea of Haiti transforming its
criminal justice system away from the French inquisitorial
model toward the American model. Beyond a certain national
chauvinism in defense of the French-founded civil code system,
many French critics think of the transition and its logistical
burden as too costly for such a poor and undeveloped country.
They also see the reforms as too difficult to implement for the
Haitian people, most of whom are unschooled and illiterate.
Indeed, it is undeniable that the maintenance of one juge
d’instruction is certainly less expensive than the party model.
However, those financial savings come at the cost of many fundamental rights that Haitians are entitled to enjoy just as
much as any other people. This particular manifestation of
“Haitian exceptionalism” must also play a role in the French
perspective that any criminal procedure reforms should proceed slowly, even though so many of the Latin countries that
have begun the transition are, themselves, very poor and underdeveloped. Finally, it should not go unnoticed that French
critics may be particularly forthright when the question is seen
as whether to adopt yet another American way of doing things.

70. See Interview by Radio Solidarity with Joseph Philippe Antonio, Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Apr. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.haitiaction.net/News/Rest3.html.
71. See Haiti Earthquake Aid Pledged by Country, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jan/14/haiti-quake-aidpledges-country-donations#data; Patricia A. Reid, The Haitian Revolution,
Black Petitioners and Refugee Widows in Maryland, 1796-1820, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 431, 438 n.25 (2010) (“The entire Haitian legal system is that of
France of the early 19th century.”).
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V. THE FIRST LAW REFORM CONFERENCE: A CLASH OF VIEWS
In June 2009, the conferences and workshops72 on the modernization of the Codes took place in Port-au-Prince. Besides
the leading members of the Haitian bar and Haitian academics,
a number of French representatives (including an appellate
judge from Toulouse and a Supreme Court Justice from Senegal), there were several independent foreign experts in attendance. One of the “godfathers” of transition movements in Latin
America, the Argentine Alberto Binder,73 made valuable contributions, along with a number of jurists from the Dominican
Republic whose experience is seen by many as a model for Haitian legal development. Several American government funding
agency officials were also present. The foreign presence also
included representatives from the U.N. Mission in Haiti
(“MINUSTAH”), the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”), the International Legal Assistance
Consortium, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Organization
of American States.
The purpose of this first conference was to expose the principal Haitian actors to the importance of this transition and to
the experiences of other countries in Latin America that had
attempted to implement the accusatorial system. As anticipated, discussion over the two days centered on several key questions.74
The first major discussion topic had to be, of necessity, the
question of the suppression or maintenance of the juge
d’instruction. Even those seeking to maintain the status quo
were, for the most part, willing to admit that adjustments had
to be made. For example, the accused should be given a lawyer
72. L’Atelier sur la Modernisation du Code Pénal et du Code d’Instruction
Criminelle [Workshop on the Modernization of the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes], June 9–10, 2009, Port-au-Prince, Haiti (agenda and materials
on file with author); see ALBRECHT, AUCOIN & O’CONNOR, supra note 8 at 1, 5.
73. Dr. Alberto Binder, Professor in Procedural Rights and the University
of Buenos Aires, is also the Director of the Public Policy Center for Socialism
(“CEPPAS”), Director of the Latin American Institute for Security and Democracy (“ILSED”), and Co-Director of the review “Judicial Systems,” published by the CEJA.
74. Commentary about this conference is drawn largely from the only formal minutes taken (“Rapport de synthèse”) as well as some of the author’s
notes and impressions.
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who has access to the file and the right to contradict and crossexamine; the police should be subjected to examination or interrogatories by the judge during the investigation phase. A
separate judge should be charged with making the preventive
detention or bail decision; the juge d’instruction must be more
respectful of individual liberties and the problem of pretrial delay. There is also the possibility of creating a panel of three
persons to oversee complex cases such as those of organized
crime. Defendants should be granted the right to appeal from
the results of the judge’s investigation. Those favoring the elimination of the present juge d’instruction, fell into two camps:
those who would follow the standard transition course and
transfer the judge’s investigating power to the prosecutor, and
those who would create a restyled juge d’instruction with much
more defined powers, including preservation of the judge’s supervision of the investigation.
It is impossible to discuss reforming the role of the trial judge
without discussing strengthening the role of the prosecutor under the new Code. The reaction of the Haitian bar to this transfer of power from the former investigating judge to the public
prosecutor has been typically circumspect. Those who tend to
trust prosecutors are in agreement with the proposed changes.
Those who prefer the watchful eye of a supposedly impartial
investigating judge resist the transfer. Particularly when it is
understood that the prosecutor would also control the investigating police, and basically displace the trial judge from any
investigatory or supervisory role, the dramatic nature of this
transformation becomes even more pronounced.
In a country such as Haiti, where neither prosecutors nor
judges are well paid and both are subject to corrupting influences, there is no reason to assume that the processes employed by the prosecutor will be any more transparent than
those of the traditionally secretive juge d’instruction. It should
be of some consolation, however, that, optimistically, there
would be a functioning defense bar, which could operate as a
check on the power of the prosecutor. When a prosecutor violates a provision of the Code or when, for example, a prosecutor
forces the police to conduct a one-sided investigation, the benefit of the adversarial system is that the defense counsel could
then bring a motion before the sitting trial judge seeking relief.
If, as is usually provided, the defense has access to discovery
while the case is progressing towards trial, it may come to the
defense counsel’s attention that the prosecutor is engaging in
misconduct, allowing the defense to pursue appropriate relief
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before the judge. This check on the prosecutor’s power can only
be realized when there is a functioning criminal defense bar in
Haiti. The training of criminal defense lawyers, along with retraining of all the principal players in the criminal justice system, should be a main focus of the infrastructure reform.
Some of the resistance to this aspect of the reform exists
simply because the public prosecutor is today under the control
of the executive branch and arguably subject to additional political influences. The fear expressed was that a subservient
prosecutor’s office would become a jurisdiction unto itself with
the power to both prosecute and judge. On the other hand, the
new Code provides that the office of the prosecutor shall be independent and that there is a clear separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. These provisions, if
complemented by the necessary increase in material and human resources, are seen as a possible path to a stand-alone
prosecutor’s office. Some safeguarding suggestions included a
precise hierarchy in the office of the public prosecutor with
clear lines of authority, creation of a civil remedy for those victimized by prosecutorial abuse, judicial supervision over malfeasance in the office, and, of course, strengthening the defense
function as part of the equal power or “egalité d’armes.” Even
those who are the most supportive of the juge d’instruction had
to agree with the absolute necessity of prescribing time limitations for the various stages of the process to avoid the same interminable delays in the prosecutor’s office as have traditionally been seen with the juge d’instruction.
Discussion over whether or not the prosecution should have
the power to dismiss unilaterally (the principle of opportunité)
a charge is generally controversial, particularly in countries
like Haiti, where corruption is a severe problem. In some transition countries, such as Italy, the judge must approve a dismissal whereas in France, for example, the prosecutor has the
sole power to do so.75 Once again, the view is that unbridled
power vested in the prosecutor can lead to corruption or influence peddling. Several provisions of the present criminal

75. Freiberg, supra note 50, at 84.
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Code76 and several decisions of the Cour de cassation have not
given the prosecutor that right.77 Nonetheless, the right to
dismiss generally was supported since it would result in a reduction in the number of docket cases and the number of persons being held without trial. The decision to dismiss a previously filed case must, however, be on the record, with notification to the victim. A discussion was also had about a third path
between prosecution and dismissal—alternative dispute resolution.
Another important question was the role of the victim in the
criminal process, as the right of participation of the victim
(“partie civile”) is another transitional sticking point. In inquisitorial systems, the victim is ordinarily much more included as
a full third party to the criminal process.78 The victim, with or
without counsel (provided the victim qualifies for free courtappointed counsel), presently has the right to appeal a judgment, to present argument, and to fully share in the, albeit limited, role enjoyed by the parties in the inquisitorial system.79 In
the Haitian draft code, the victim, defined as a person who has
“personally and directly suffered damage” as a result of the
crime, even has the right to contest before the trial judge a
prosecutor’s decision to deny him or her designation as partie
civile. In the accusatorial model, the victim loses that third
party role. The prosecutor, at least in the American model, is
charged with protecting the participation of the victim. This
ordinarily means that the victim, who is often the complaining
witness, can be a witness at a preliminary hearing, motion, or
trial if called by the prosecutor and can testify, with restrictions, during sentencing.80 Beyond that, the American system, at least, allows the victim to proceed civilly for money
damages or other appropriate relief, but in a separate cause of
action.
The prospect of a drastically reduced role for the victim in the
adversarial system was not well received in Haiti, just as it has
76. See CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.C.] arts. 37, 42, 51 (Haiti),
translated in GENDARMERIE TRANSLATION OF THE CODE PÉNAL AND THE CODE
D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE 8–12 (1922).
77. In French civil parlance, the right to dismiss is referred to as système
d’opportunité.
78. See Freiberg, supra note 50, at 92–93.
79. See Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure:
The States’ Turning Point, 15 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 53, 70 (2008).
80. Reference here is made to the victim impact statements approved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824–30 (1991).
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not been well received in other transition states, particularly
those where victims seldom actually bring civil suits and look
to the criminal trial for damages.81 Even when presented with,
if nothing else, the logistical difficulties of three-party trials,
including three opening statements, three closing arguments,
three direct examinations, three cross-examinations, and three
sets of exhibits and motions, it was never seriously doubted
that the new Code would continue to recognize the victim’s
rights as in the old Code. Those rights, as the draft law is presently written, would also include the presentation, by the victim, of third-party witnesses such as experts. The rights of the
victim would also include, in the new Code, perhaps the most
obstructing provision of all: the victim’s right to contest a prosecutor’s decision to drop a case.82 The importance of allowing a
prosecutor to drop criminal charges that should not be in the
system or cannot be proven is difficult to overestimate when
considering the enormous backlog of cases. Should victims be
allowed to contest that decision through court proceedings that
can do nothing but frustrate the intent to relieve the congested
dockets, Haiti will continue to face the possibility of protracted
proceedings in potentially every case.
Analyzing the reluctance to transition to a more common-law
version of the role of the victim is not difficult when one understands the importance, in Haiti, of public acceptance of this entire transition. To tell victims that they would have a much
more limited role would undoubtedly provoke a feeling of not
having been heard or not having had a day in court, and could
therefore diminish the public confidence essential to the success of the system even before implementation.
There seemed to be consensus that a partie civile could only
be a physical person and could not be a business or corporation,
personne morale. There also seemed to be a consensus that the
role of the victim should remain unchanged from that presently
existing under Haitian law, meaning that the victim can assert
his or her rights at all phases of the criminal process, including
the right, as discussed, to petition the judiciary when the pros81. See, e.g., CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] arts. 74, 75 (It.). Under
these provisions, civil actions are joined to the criminal proceeding. Id.
82. See discussion of the prosecutor’s right of opportunité supra notes 59,
75–77 and accompanying text.
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ecutor refuses to prosecute. Some advocated that “associations”
could also be treated as parties civiles. Finally, to help alleviate
the concern that victims would be shut out of the process, there
was also support for the idea that victims of unsolved crimes
should receive indemnification from a public fund.83
The question of preventive detention self-divided into two
sub-issues: la garde a vue, referring generally to the period of
time officials can detain a suspect for purposes of investigation
without presentment to a judge,84 and the more internationally
standardized concept of preventive or pretrial detention. La
garde a vue not only had its supporters at the Haitian conference, but a number of jurists felt that the traditional limit of
forty-eight hours of detention was unrealistically short given
the problems of communication, distance, and transportation.
In serious cases, an indefinite garde a vue under judicial supervision was proposed. Others, perhaps in the majority, felt
that the forty-eight-hour limitation was a constitutional guarantee of individual rights and liberties that must not be
touched. As to preventive detention, referring to all detention
prior to judgment, the conference reinforced the idea that liberty is the rule, that detention should be the exception, and that
any judicial decision to hold a suspect would have to not only
conform to the speedy trial provisions of the Code, but must
also be the subject of a decision on the record by the judicial
officer. Any prolonged detention would have to be justified on
the record, with a right to appeal the detention, and to be released when the limits were surpassed. The conference also reconfirmed the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to contest detention.85
Another important question was the nature of proceedings in
minor criminal cases or “contraventions.” In Haiti, justices of
the peace, most of whom are not lawyers, typically preside over
these proceedings. They also serve a double function (“double
casquette”) as judicial police, meaning that they investigate the
cases over which they will later preside. In the inquisitorial
system, that is the classic dynamic. In the party system, however, the double casquette is a source of confusion and dysfunc83. Conference notes and materials on file with author.
84. For a discussion of Mireille Delmas-Marty’s comments before the
French Senate on the garde vue, see Audition de Mme. Mireille DelmasMarty, Professeur À L’Université de Paris I, Responsible de la Commission
“Justice Pénale et Droits de l’Homme” en 1988–1990, BIENVENUE AU SÉNAT,
available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/l99-283/l99-28325.html.
85. Conference notes and materials on file with author.
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tion in the procedural chain. Most participants wished to end
the double function and return investigation to the judicial police. A minority felt that a police investigation conducted by a
justice of the peace normally inspired more confidence in the
results.
A more controversial issue was who should be the fact-finder
at trial. Even though the present Haitian Constitution calls for
jury trials in certain cases,86 there was, in the drafting process,
very little support for the adoption of criminal jury trials. The
objections were typical in that the participating Haitian lawyers did not feel that their fellow citizens were “qualified” to
apply the law to the facts of a case. This has generally been the
reaction in most transitioning Latin American countries.87 The
idea that a decision by a jury could be seen as more legitimate
because it comes from the people themselves does not yet have
traction in Haiti. Several alternative proposals were made.
Some reformers were content to stay with one judge, while others preferred a panel of three persons including at least one
judge. Not only were very few participants in favor of the
American model of the six or twelve-person jury, but few were
willing to support even the maintenance of the present Haitian
Constitutional provision.88 If there was a consensus point, it
would have been around the three-person panel, as proposed
and reserved for felony-type cases, while the single judge would
oversee minor crimes. Some felt that panels of judges are simply unrealistic, given the lack of resources and the high costs of
training. Almost all participants agreed, however, on the idea
of judge specializations (“chambres specialisées”) where judges
86. Article 50 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti calls for
jury trials in “crimes de sang” or “blood felonies.” CONST. of 1987 art. 50 (Haiti). Commentators say, however, that there have been no jury trials for several years. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, HAITI: JUSTICE REFORM AND THE SECURITY
CRISIS 3 (2007) [hereinafter SECURITY CRISIS].
87. See Cavise, supra note 14, at 803–04. For an example of one of the few
codes that has introduced a jury system, see CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL
[C.P.P.] art. X (Bol.) (enacted on March 25, 1999, as Law No. 1970). On the
other hand, Brazil has had a jury system since 1822. In that country, a group
of seven jurors is selected from a group of twenty-one as the “Jury Council.”
Edmundo Hendler, Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent Experience, 15 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 4–5 (2008).
88. CONST. of 1987 art. 50 (Haiti).
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with particular training would preside over certain types of
cases.
Internationally, in those criminal court systems where there
is no jury, the rules of evidence and discovery are not highly
developed. Theoretically, the judge does not need to be protected from the introduction of prejudicial evidence such as improper character evidence or hearsay. Often, particular code
provisions are adopted to reflect evidentiary concerns, rather
than embarking on the more complex process of elaborating
rules of evidence or discovery. Some participants at the Haitian
conference were in favor of the adoption of a code of evidence to
control the admissibility or nonadmissibility of physical or material proof, the accessibility of all proof to both sides, and the
availability of experts and technical or scientific proof. Others
felt that particular Code provisions would be sufficient. The
question was left unresolved.
Another key procedural mechanism of the accusatorial system that has received a mixed reaction in Haiti is plea bargaining. In the inquisitorial system, guilty pleas ordinarily are not
admitted since the investigating judge decides guilt or innocence. However, most civil systems have found a way to accommodate some degree of plea negotiation to adapt to rising
crime rates and limited judicial resources.89 The hesitation is
due to the philosophical difficulties inquisitorial countries have
had with the idea that justice would depend on a negotiation,
sometimes regardless of actual guilt or innocence.90 The Haitian reaction to plea bargaining proposals was typical of civil
law countries. Lawyers are very hesitant both to see culpability
as an object of deal-making and to give prosecutors and defense
lawyers, independent of the judge, the authority to arrive at a
negotiated disposition. To include a provision that the judge
must approve the plea bargain is often of little consolation.
What most transitioning countries fail to appreciate is that
plea bargaining can relieve much of the stress on the criminal
justice system and that a large percentage of cases can be disposed of through equitable and reasonable negotiation. Unfortunately, Haitians have seen the results of the plea bargaining
system in the United States where fully 97% of all criminal
cases in the federal system and 94% of all state cases are disposed of by guilty pleas,91 rendering most of the previously
89. See, e.g., Marafioti, supra note 16, at 90.
90. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11.
91. Frye v. Missouri, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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cherished trial rights largely illusory. They have also come to
understand that the desperately overcrowded American criminal system has led to Supreme Court sanctioning of what could
be considered distortions of plea bargaining, such as North
Carolina v. Alford92 or Bordenkircher v. Hayes.93 It is one thing
to encourage a country to adopt plea bargaining grosso modo,
but to include the notion that one can plead guilty without actually being guilty,94 or that a prosecutor can threaten to and
actually increase the charges on a defendant who refuses to
plead guilty,95 would be to delegitimize the process as consistent with basic human rights norms.
Rather than sublimate human rights protections within other
provisions of the new Code, it was determined that a human
rights preamble should introduce it, partially to codify but also
to make the statement that human rights is at the forefront of
this reform. At the conclusion of the conference, the author was
asked to draft the human rights preamble to the new criminal
procedure Code. That work was undertaken immediately in full
anticipation of another conference in a few months at which the
discussion could be continued.
On January 12, 2010, the earthquake struck Haiti, centering
on a point just outside Port-au-Prince, the seat of government
and home to all central government institutions. As many as
300,000 people were killed, and even more were injured;
208,000 residences were destroyed, along with 1300 educational institutions, and more than fifty hospitals and health centers.96 The National Palace, the Ministry of Justice, and the
Supreme Court buildings were destroyed. Since the earthquake, institutions throughout Haiti have been in a state of
disarray if not total dysfunction. As the United Nations Development Programme noted:
The earthquake destroyed almost all the Government’s infrastructures (buildings, archives, technical and IT systems) and

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1970).
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
Alford, 400 U.S. at 39.
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 21, at 6–7.
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severely affected its capacity to deliver the basic public and
administrative services . . . .97

Violence erupted almost everywhere. Looting, even graverobbing, massive prison escapes,98 and a complete absence of
local authority throughout the affected region of the country
worsened the situation.99 Women have suffered particularly in
the aftermath in that sexual abuse, always prevalent in Haitian society,100 became an epidemic in the tent cities.101 Key
personnel in the criminal justice system, including various key
officials in the Ministry of Justice and various members of the
Cour de cassation, did not survive. There was also widespread
loss of judicial files with the destruction of judicial buildings.102
The capacity of the very diminished government to carry out
large justice reforms seemed most implausible, especially in
the face of widespread starvation, homelessness, and violence.
With Port-au-Prince in chaos, without essential infrastructure such as electricity and clean water, and with food in short
supply, it was fully expected that the law reform project would
be put on hold indefinitely—at least until the basic needs of the
population had been fulfilled. That was a mistaken assumption. In the days after the earthquake, President René Préval
summoned his surviving ministers to his base at the airport
and the rule of law was again declared a priority for the gov-

97. United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Governance: Democratic Process and Public Administration Reform (March 2010), available at
http://204.200.211.71/_assets/fichier/publication/CN_5_Governance.pdf.
98. By one estimate, some 4000 inmates escaped, most of whom had never
been tried or convicted but were awaiting trial in a system that does not provide for bail. Ashby Jones, On Rebuilding the Haitian Criminal-Justice System: Where to Start?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:33 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/19/on-rebuilding-the-haitian-criminaljustice-system-where-to-start/ (quoting Gerald Shargel, Haiti’s Lawless
Streets,
DAILY
BEAST
(Jan
17,
2010
5:35
PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/01/17/haitis-lawless-streets.html).
99. Id.
100. Benedetta Faedi, The Double Weakness of Girls: Discrimination and
Sexual Violence in Haiti, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 147, 165 (2008).
101. The situation remains, at this writing, out of control, even in the face
of the adoption, in July 2005, of a statute requiring that laws against rape be
enforced. James D. Wilets & Camilo Espinosa, Rule of Law in Haiti Before
and After the 2010 Earthquake, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 201
(2011); Faedi, supra note 100, at 181–82 (discussing the Décret Modifiant le
Régime des Agressions Sexuelles et Éliminant en la Matière les Discriminations Contre la Femme).
102. See also HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 21, at 7.

2013]

LEGAL REFORM IN HAITI

909

ernment.103 The Minister of Justice contacted all Haitian
courts, prosecutors, and police to request an assessment of
damage and fatalities, along with an inventory of urgent needs.
He also reactivated the Ministry of Justice in a series of warehouses near the destroyed Ministry.104 Amidst this chaos, barely three weeks after the earthquake, the third draft of the procedural Code began circulating and, within two months, another conference was called.105
VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS PREAMBLE
The best hope for democracy in Haiti ultimately lies in respect for the human rights and autonomy of each individual.
Most agree that there is parity between respect for individual
human rights and the creation of a democracy.106 One cannot
overstate the role that the legal system can play in the development of human rights and therefore in the transition to democracy. This is particularly true in a country like Haiti that
has suffered dictatorship, occupation, and privation for so long
and has so little tradition of democracy.107 Nonetheless, the
people of Haiti hunger for their human rights and have often
risen in protest against an autocracy designed to oppress them.
It is not enough to pass new codes. That kind of formal recognition of rights has yet to yield practical results in Haiti. The
supremacy of law remains unrecognized. The equality of persons before the law is still only an aspiration. The accountability of government officials is nonexistent. The accessibility of
law is not a reality for most people. Efficiency, predictability,
and transparency are unknown.108 A national discussion must
be held among all those whose lives are affected by the criminal
justice system. This discussion cannot be held while Haitians
103. VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, U.S. INST. OF PEACE [USIP], PEACE BRIEF 18: THE
RULE OF LAW IN HAITI AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 3 (2010).
104. Id.
105. The reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, at this writing, in its
eighth draft form, the most recent having been issued in June 2012.
106. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 27.
107. “Governance lies at the root of Haiti’s multiple crises. Decades of dictatorship and military coups with only short democratic interludes have hindered the emergence of a coherent and nationally owned governance system.”
See UNDP, supra note 97.
108. See generally, Wilets & Espinosa, supra note 101, at 199–208.
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are still living in tents at displacement camps. The discussion
must be had hand-in-hand with recovery.
It would be supremely progressive if Haiti were to develop a
social consensus around universally recognized principles that
guarantee the rights of the individual, including the right to
participate in the democracy, to choose between competing interests, and to have an equal voice in the popular debate.109
The human rights aspect of a new criminal law and procedure
is likely to be the part most noticed by a distrusting populace
that was never exposed to a working legal system. Developing a
social consensus might spark a new moral consciousness born
of respect for the government and its laws, and of increased intolerance for corruption, bias, and impunity.110
At this point, the recognition of “the autonomous individual
as a paradigm for democracy”111 by the public is practically impossible, given the institutional dysfunction, the disorganization of political parties, and the lack of resources for public education. In anticipation of the country’s development of democratic institutions and the consolidation of the structural integrity of the nation, the legal system must be ready. It must assure the Haitian people that there can be justice in the country,
that judges and legal officials do not have to be corrupt, and,
most importantly, that any arrested person can look forward to
more than languishing in a local jail without charges, without a
lawyer, and without any defense. The legal system must afford
the individual defendant the opportunity to contest the charges
and to put the system to the test.112
An important step in the process of the consolidation of the
rule of law is the drafting of the fundamental human rights
guarantees (“Principes Fondamentaux” or “Fundamental Principles”). Haiti must adopt these and apply them to every criminal defendant. In the United States, most individual rights are
109. See Stotzky, The Indispensable State, supra note 25, at 217.
110. See Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 9 (discussing how
law influences moral consciousness in countries like Haiti).
111. Id. at 11.
112. Haiti is a state party to the key international treaties pertaining to
human rights and the administration of justice, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the American Convention on Human
Rights (providing for equality before the law, the right to personal liberty, the
right to a fair trial, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and the
due process of law). See HAITI: FAILED JUSTICE?, supra note 33, at 22–26, 55–
57.
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encapsulated in the Bill of Rights and elaborated upon through
case law. In Haiti, as today’s framers contemplated the drafting of a new criminal procedure Code, it was determined that
the code should be preceded by a formal declaration of those
rights drawn from international guarantees, the preamble of
the criminal procedure Code of the Dominican Republic, and
from a sense of the Haitian needs.
The human rights principles are intentionally brief to allow
for the Code itself to be the more complete elaboration. However, the preamble is significant in that it adopts basic human
rights principles hitherto unspecified in Haitian law. The most
important Fundamental Principles, beginning with Article 110
of the eighth draft of the Code of Criminal Procedure are:113
1. All persons are equal before the law and in court, and are
subject to the same rules. The law must prohibit all discrimination, notably that of race, color, sex, language, religion, sexual
preference, political opinion, national or social origin, or socioeconomic resources.
2. The legality principle, which provides that no crime shall
be charged unless, at the moment of commission, Haitian or
international law to which Haiti is a signatory makes the act
criminal, is codified. Where there is sufficient evidence that a
crime has been committed, the prosecutor normally is required
by law to prosecute.114 Punishment shall not be imposed, if it is
not authorized in the applicable law at the time of commission.
Laws shall be made retroactive only when they operate in favor
of the accused.
3. There is a presumption of innocence in the code’s preamble. Haitians have the right to be silent without any inference
of culpability, the right to be free from testifying against oneself, the right to have the prosecution bear the burden of proof,
the prohibition of press coverage that presumes the guilt of the
accused, the right to be free from deprivation of pretrial liberty
except in exceptional cases, and the right to judicial review. In
addition, to deal with the complicated issues of the garde à

113. Conference notes and materials on file with author.
114. This is the version of the legality principle as adopted in countries such
as Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Freiberg, supra note 50, at
84.
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vue,115 the Preamble also provides that Defendants shall be
brought before a judge within forty-eight hours to determine
pretrial release.
4. The state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
(“au-dela de toute doute raisonnable.”).
5. All suspected or prosecuted persons have the right to be informed of the charges against them, the right to be assisted by
a lawyer and, if necessary, an interpreter, and the right to be
present at trial. The right to counsel includes counsel during
police interrogations, the preliminary phase, and all phases of
trial. For those who cannot afford counsel, one will be appointed free of charge.
6. The function of investigation and judicial review shall be
separate.
7. The trial shall be held within a reasonable period of time.
8. All evidence admitted before the court and entered into the
record must have been obtained legally or must be rejected by
the tribunal.
9. Depositions and the trial until the pronouncement of
judgment shall be conducted orally.
10. Cross-examination is at the center of the criminal process.
This means that the accused has the right to be physically present at the trial and all other parts of the trial procedure, the
right to dispute the evidence or indications of culpability, and
the right to enter exculpatory evidence.
11. There is a guaranteed right to appeal a conviction. This
requires a written decision from the trial court as to both facts
and law.
12. Double jeopardy is prohibited, including a ban against a
second prosecution even where the first prosecution was
dropped or dismissed, unless new elements have been discovered.
13. Foreign judgments will be recognized in accordance with
international treaties and conventions. The decision of an international court recognized by Haiti could provoke a reopening
of a previously disposed-of case.
14. The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is
guaranteed.
15. There is also an explicit right to a fair and public trial.

115. See supra note 84 and accompanying materials.

2013]

LEGAL REFORM IN HAITI

913

VII. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
THAT DIFFER FROM THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
Beyond the preamble, the Code as drafted includes a large
number of other provisions characteristic of the accusatorial
system. The most basic guarantees for the defendant, such as
the right to defense counsel, the right to independently call
witnesses, and the right to produce evidence, are all improvements on the old system that was so reliant on the investigating judge. Those new rights are reflected throughout the Code.
The Haitian decision to include a role for the victims remains
a major variance with classical accusatorial procedure. Aside
from granting the victim full party status, the Code also specifies that victims will be treated with compassion, dignity, and
respect, and that their interests will be taken into account at
all stages, especially when the victim is a minor, a senior citizen, physically or mentally handicapped, or a victim of sexual
violence or other violations against women. The victim has a
right to demand that an investigation be opened, and the right
to present evidence. The government must consider those demands. The victim shall also be notified of the progress of the
case. Additionally, the trial tribunal can order that the victim
be given access to the case file and the evidence, and ensure
that the victim’s right to counsel and to present experts is not
infringed.
Another unorthodox set of provisions concerns the method of
questioning witnesses. Counsel may ask questions and even
make brief observations or commentary during the questioning
of the defendant. First, the prosecution calls its witnesses, followed by the defense and the victim, and, if necessary, the
judge. Both the prosecution and the defense have the right to
respond, implying that what is called a rebuttal case in the
United States is afforded not only to the prosecution but also to
the defense—not normally the case in the United States.116 All
witnesses may be cross-examined and the judge may question
witnesses if she wishes. Cross-examinations must be relevant
either to the case or to the credibility of the witness. Witnesses
116. In the United States, the prosecution normally has the right to present
a rebuttal case after the defense case. In the discretion of the judge, the defense may call witnesses after the prosecution’s rebuttal but that is reserved
to the extraordinary discretion of the trial judge.
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are first examined by direct examination, followed by crossexamination, followed by redirect, as necessary.
Conditions of pretrial release remain somewhat different.
The new Code retains the old inquisitorial procedure of holding
a recently arrested defendant in garde à vue for people where
there is a “reasonable motive.”117 Those motives include the
prevention of flight or destruction of evidence. The garde à vue
is for twenty-four hours, but the chief prosecutor may authorize
a twenty-four-hour extension. If the detainee has an attorney,
that Mission de l’Administration Penitentiare attorney must be
notified of the detention and may communicate in confidentiality with the detainee. There is also a specific right to have a
family member notified of the detention. Aside from the obvious difference that there is no garde à vue in the American system, there is also the fact that, for almost all crimes in the
United States, a bond amount will be set which entitles the defendant to pretrial release upon posting. The Haitian system,
much like other transition states, does not adopt the bailsetting procedures. After the garde à vue period has passed, the
criminal defendant is either released or detained until trial,
depending on a variety of factors including flight risk, danger
to the community, and the seriousness of the charged offense.
There is no provision for plea bargaining in the new Code.
There are provisions concerning the right to plead guilty and
the power of the judge to consider guilty pleas when passing a
sentence, but there are no provisions granting the prosecutor
the right to reduce or dismiss charges pursuant to guilty plea
or the right to make an agreement with defense counsel as to
sentencing, subject to the judge’s approval. The success of the
new Code and the reformed system will depend largely on the
acceptability of plea bargaining as a way of dislodging the overcrowded courts in Haiti.
VIII. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
THAT RESEMBLE THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
Turning to those provisions that more evenly track the classical accusatorial procedure, a large number of provisions govern
how the case is to be handled in the pretrial stage. Access to
the case dossier is a key aspect of the reform in that the international concept of the egalité d’armes is meaningless if the
files are unavailable to the defense. Under the proposed Code,
117. See supra note 84 and accompanying materials.
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access is permitted whenever the court is open. Within five
days, the chief prosecutor can ask the court to deny access in
cases of possible pressure or intimidation of witnesses or victims. The decision to deny access is itself appealable.
As to investigation, any of the parties, including the victim,
can demand that the prosecutor conduct an interrogation, investigate a certain place, or make any other inquiry that is
necessary to the investigation. The parties may also request
certain tests by experts. In case of refusal, the parties may approach the judge of the preliminary or investigative stage. As
to investigative techniques, the Code has very specific provisions on the interception of communications, including telecommunications, surveillance, personal mail, financial transactions, and the like.
The problem of cases lying dormant for many months or even
several years was addressed. In cases where no investigation
has been conducted for four months, the defendant can demand
that the prosecution close the investigation. If the chief prosecutor does not move to close the investigation within one
month, the defendant can petition the judge.
The defendant must be immediately advised of his right to
remain and that he has a right to a court-appointed lawyer if
lacking sufficient funds to hire his own. These
Miranda-type warnings must be given before any interrogation.118 In addition, all persons interrogated must be advised of
the right to an interpreter. If the person requests counsel, no
further questions may be asked until the attorney arrives or
until two hours have passed at which time the questioning may
begin again. As to the questioning of other witnesses, the code
declares that measures for the protection of witnesses must be
taken where justified, including provisions for anonymous witnesses.
Rights guaranteed under what would be the Fourth and Fifth
Constitutional Amendments in the United States are codebased in Haiti. The key provisions are that evidence seized
without a warrant is inadmissible. Warrants must be based on
“reasonable motives.” The proposed code is very specific about
the content of any warrant and the exceptions. For example,
118. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

916

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

immediate danger to a person in the place of search will excuse
the necessity for a warrant. There is also a provision that law
enforcement must avoid unnecessary modes of intrusion such
as the “knock first” rule and restrictions on execution of warrants between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Also based upon “reasonable
motives,” there are specified limitations on the search of a person or an automobile without a warrant.
Expert witnesses may be requested by the parties or the investigating judge. The procedures for the request are outlined
in the Code. The provisions are very detailed, right down to the
oath that the witness must take. The Code even specifies the
medicolegal extent of autopsies. DNA examinations must be
done pursuant to warrant.
In all criminal matters, the accused is first declared to be under “judicial control.” The preliminary judge (“juge de l’enquête
et des libertés”) may impose a restriction from a long list of possible restraints upon the accused. All of those restrictions can
be reviewed or modified upon demand, with special provisions
for modification of pretrial conditions after the case has passed
from the investigation to the trial stage, meaning after a finding of probable guilt has been made. The investigative judge
may order pretrial detention in “exceptional” cases, where the
accused is subject to at least three years of imprisonment upon
conviction, or where the accused has violated the conditions of
pretrial release. These decisions are subject to appeal. The detention cannot exceed “a reasonable duration,” which is defined
as either four or six months depending on the seriousness of
the crime, with the usual provisions for an extension if in conformity with a lengthy set of criteria.119
No witness is required to incriminate himself. Statements of
witnesses made before trial are available to refresh a witness’
recollection, but may not be put to substantive use. In a section
called “Rules of Evidence,” relevance is required and there are
prohibitions against cumulative evidence, evidence unlawfully
seized or coerced, privileged information, evidence of prior sexual behavior, uncounseled confessions, and “proof which damages the integrity or equity of the proceedings or the rights of
the accused.”
The court for minor offenses (“tribunal correctionnel”) will be
composed of one judge. Cases will be placed on the docket pursuant to citation or garde à vue. Civil parties can use the criminal proceeding to sue for damages. A decision as to guilt or in119. Conference notes and materials on file with author.
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nocence will also include an amount for damages. More serious
offenses will be tried in tribunaux criminels presided over by a
judge or jury, as previously described. Verdicts are by majority
vote. The least serious offenses (“contraventions”) will be tried
by justices of the peace. The judge of the investigatory phase
cannot participate in the trial (incompatibilité). All trials and
preliminary hearings are to be public and in the presence of the
defendant. Audio or visual recording, in the judge’s discretion,
is required unless there are “precise” written minutes.
Appellate rights are also set forth, providing not only an appeal of right but also that the appeal will be de novo and not
simply restricted to a review of questions of law.120 The Code
also makes provisions for writs of habeas corpus specifying
when a prisoner must be released from custody, for extradition
of defendants to other countries under international agreements, and for the special treatment of juveniles.
IX. INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM IN HAITI
It is obvious that any reform to the Criminal Law and Procedure Codes must be accompanied by training and increased capabilities by all justice actors. In the judiciary, the Superior
Judiciary Council awaits a filling of eight vacancies,121 the Judicial Inspection Unit (“JIU”) and the Academy for the Training of Judges (“École de la Magistrature”) must be reorganized
and strengthened.122 The Cour de cassation has a number of
vacancies.123 All need both human and financial resources.124
As to the attorneys who will now take lead roles in the conduct
of criminal cases, training in the new system, resources for adequate salaries and facilities, and coordination with the police
and court personnel will be fundamental. This is particularly
true if the guarantee of adequate defense counsel is to have any
meaning. Since Haiti has no tradition of public defense, a public defender’s office composed of trained and adequately funded
120. See supra Part V.
121. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Trial judge salaries are estimated at between $400 and $500 per
month. SECURITY CRISIS, supra note 86, at 3–4. Poorly compensated judges is
a prime reason for corruption. See Salas, supra note 54, at 26–27.
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personnel will be essential. Until now, the bar associations
have been expected to provide pro bono counsel in criminal cases, however, in many areas of the country, there are no bar associations whatsoever. Where they do exist, support has been
woefully inadequate.125
To acculturate the practicing bar to the new way of trying
cases, there needs to be massive reeducation, starting in the
law schools. Projects envisaging advocacy training in the law
school curriculum should be encouraged. The bar associations,
both in Port-au-Prince and in the principal political subdivisions, called départements, should also develop a variety of
training programs to train its present members. Classes and
tutorials in oral procedure, investigative techniques, direct and
cross-examination, and legal argument would be necessary. Internationals can be of particular assistance in this aspect of
training.
This is not to overlook the essential element that the office of
the public prosecutor, through the Ministry of Justice or independently, must retool to oversee any reform process to assure
its integrity.126 Key to the effective functioning of the party system is the independence of the prosecutor. As an organ of the
executive, there could always be attempts at interference with
prosecutorial authority in ways that would not even be attempted with the judiciary. Prosecutors will also have to be
trained in investigative techniques and supervision of the investigating police. With little experience in actual investigation, one can anticipate a continuing over-reliance on defendant
confessions. At some point, however, prosecutors will have to
learn how to conduct on-the-scene forensic investigations independently and how to supervise the police, who will also need
training.
As much hesitation as there is in Haiti about such a major
transfer of power from the judge to the prosecutor, there is,
125. SECURITY CRISIS, supra note 86, at 5. At various times, there have been
other programs designed to address the absence of defense counsel, including
a U.S. Administration of Justice program in the last decade under which law
students were trained to provide defense representation. The program failed
for lack of supervision. Id. at 9–10. The International Legal Assistance Consortium (“ILAC”) has, over the years, begun pilot programs in various areas
of the country to provide counsel or judicial assistance. Some of those programs still exist. See, e.g., Important ILAC Break-through in Haiti, INT’L
LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
CONSORTIUM
(Jan.
18,
2011),
http://www.ilac.se/2011/01/18/important-ilac-break-through-in-haiti/.
126. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11.
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nonetheless, a consensus view the new code represents a major
improvement in the human rights guarantees of the defendant.127 Much of the success of the new Code will depend on the
good will and talent of prosecutors who now must bring and
possibly dismiss charges; honor all the constitutional and human rights provisions regarding search and seizure, preventive
detention, and speedy trial; and supervise the investigating police in the collection and preservation of evidence. One can expect resistance from several quarters, including from the Haitian judicial police.128 Haitian judicial authorities have traditionally operated largely as independent units—judge, prosecutor, and police—and not as components of a single system.129
Justices of the peace in Haiti are the local judges who sit in
judgment of all offenses that are not serious felonies.130 The
justices are normally not trained legal professionals. This results not only in a lack of uniformity but also in violations of
fundamental human rights by justices who are insensitive to,
or unschooled in, basic guarantees. This creates a particularly
dangerous human rights situation since justices of the peace
handle fully 80% of all cases outside Port-au-Prince.131 To make
matters worse, Haitian judicial authorities do not require that
justices of the peace separate the judicial function from their
other common role as judicial police (the double casquette).132
There have been training programs for justices of the peace in
the past—most of them unsuccessful attempts at creating a
culture change in administration of local justice. This time, the
training needs to be part of and simultaneous with a nationwide effort at broad reform so that the justices know that this
is not just one more foreign attempt to change how they have
always done things.133
Since investigation of crime should eventually fall to the police (under prosecutorial supervision), whether it be the judicial
127.
VIII.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 10, and discussion supra Part
KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
SECURITY CRISIS, supra note 86, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
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police or other duly constituted enforcement agency, it goes
without saying that training, equipment, and salary increases
are absolutely necessary. For example, forensic evidence is virtually unknown in Haiti for lack of training and resources. Beyond that, if the prosecutors are to oversee investigation, working with the police and carrying cases through trial, there must
be guarantees of independence and freedom from retaliation,
professional or otherwise. One suggestion is that an Office of
the Attorney General be created to oversee prosecutorial careers and their functioning within the trial and appellate system.134
Case management systems are noticeably absent as well.
There is no uniform system for registering or filing cases or
case records. There is no coordination between court administrators and the prison system. There is a lack of communication between the local centers and Port-au-Prince. Police have
no way to know of a suspect’s criminal record. Prison authorities have no way to learn of court dates.135 For that matter,
there is a lack of basic office supplies. Again, international assistance would be crucial, as it has been in many Latin countries, to establish a uniform records maintenance and communication system. In Haiti, however, there has traditionally been
a reluctance to fund infrastructure because of concerns about
sustainability.136
Since much of this reform process centers on the political will
to spend the resources necessary to give the criminal justice
system a new foundation, it is noteworthy that the new President, Michel Martelly, has announced that he intends to respect the separation of powers between the executive and the
judiciary and that, despite indications to the contrary, he believes the reforms to the justice sector should continue.137 In
January 2012, President Martelly reconstituted the reform
commissions, naming some new members, maintaining René

134. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11.
135. SECURITY CRISIS, supra note 86, at 2–3.
136. There is a long history in Haiti of funding projects that do not result in
any permanent changes but rather function only as long as the funding term.
Id. at 4.
137. See id. at 13–16; Steven Monroe, Haiti Monthly Wrap Up—July 2012,
FRONTIERS
BLOG
(July
31,
2012),
EMERGING
http://emergingfrontiersblog.com/2012/07/31/haiti-monthly-wrap-up-july2012/.
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Magloire as vice-president, and continuing the mandate for two
years.138
There is some degree of importance to the rapidity with
which the reforms are instituted. This is a period of wholesale
transformation in Haiti: in commerce, agriculture, government,
labor, and housing. A complete reform of the criminal law and
procedure system should be integrated into this era of change
in the country. External funding is probably more available
now and in the short-term than it will be in the long-term.
Finding that the executive and the parliament are attuned to
and capable of making major changes should be more attractive to funders than the piecemeal reforms that do little to address the kind of impunity that has endemically marked the
system.139
X. DEVELOPING THE SOCIAL CONSENSUS
All parties in Haiti understand that the legal recognition of
human and procedural rights does not at all guarantee their
enforcement in practice.140 Several transition efforts in other
countries of Latin America have at least temporarily halted because of the failure to recognize that any codification must be
accompanied not only by structural reform, as discussed, but
also be a wide-ranging campaign of public education and discussion.141 That discussion must be carried to the local level,
which is where most people encounter the criminal justice system. At that level, there must be a series of town hall-type sessions, seminars, school programs, and even debates in civil society to not only understand the new Codes, but to recognize a
new morality implicit in the Codes. In this aspect of the reform,
as with the infrastructural reforms, the international community plays a key role but a role that must be directed by the
Haitian actors at every stage.142
The Haitian people are accustomed to seeing flowery and enlightened prose in new laws emanating from Port-au-Prince.
138. Valéry Daudier, Pour la réforme de la justice, LE NOUVELLISTE (Jan. 16,
2012), http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article4.php?newsid=101658 (Haiti).
139. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11.
140. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 8.
141. Salas, supra note 54, at 44–45.
142. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 34.
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What they are not accustomed to seeing is any attempt to ask
their opinion about the changes and what those revisions mean
for rebuilding the society according to a more humane and value-based model. Those discussions may raise the hopes and
consciousness of the people enough to defeat endemic cynicism
and give the reforms a chance to work. “[S]uch a consciousness,
if fully rooted, constitutes the most permanent and efficacious
barrier against the enemies of human dignity.”143
The discussion of moral principles that govern us as citizens
is an exciting one and should be even more exciting in a country like Haiti, which is only now seeing the importance of the
dialogue. The debate in connection with this project entails not
only parsing out the provisions, particularly the human rights
guarantees, but also delving into the social constructs that inform the Codes. The concepts of “due process of law” can be
placed in juxtaposition to the deprivations wreaked by the
state’s coercive methods, which have, for years, dominated the
political agenda. Notions of justice, truth, and impartiality
should be resurrected to allow a sort of cleansing process, much
like many nations have attempted in truth commissions.144
In “advanced” democracies, elected representatives of the
people, the media, the executive, and the courts normally lead
the discussion. In Haiti, the discussion will be more difficult
quite simply because that foundation of trust or confidence in
the wisdom of leaders is almost entirely absent. The channels
of participation must be widened. The debates must be sharpened, the discourse more rational. The deterioration of political
parties hinders such discourse. The preference of the corporate
interests in having their discussions with the government in
private is a major disadvantage to both the Haitian people and
a democratic reform process.145 The international community
must be included but controlled. The draw of the charismatic
leader is often dangerous as it leads to over-confidence among a
people starving for honest and competent leadership. Finally,
the tradition of dictatorship has in essence stifled the voice of
all but a few of the Haitian people. The major motivating factor
for this silence, which is the fear of the people in speaking out,
must be overcome.
143. Id. at 9.
INT’L,
144. See
Truth
Commissions,
AMNESTY
http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-commissions
(last visited May 19, 2013).
145. Stotzky, The Truth About Haiti, supra note 62, at 6.
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Haiti has never been a deliberative democracy. One can easily understand why, given the almost unfathomable series of
indignities inflicted on the Haitian people. How can one rationally discuss a legal system when privation and need abound?
How can the government expect support and cooperation from
the people when the legitimacy and moral justification of the
government is itself largely rejected? When public servants are
perceived as corrupt and authoritarian, how can any legislative
work-product gain popular acceptance? How can the international community be trusted when, for so long, other countries
have exploited Haiti, its people and its land for profit? These
are all impressive theoretical mountains to climb.
In Haiti, the criminal law and procedure system is more important than what appears on the surface. A popular discussion
can succeed if the people agree that the system can be changed
and that, at the end of the process, Haiti can take its place as a
country governed by the rule of law. Popular discussions have
happened before in Haiti.146 This time, that focus could be human rights and the criminal justice system. With the attention
of the population and the government focused, the international community will finally understand that the Haitian people
will not simply adopt the foreign vision of democracy. It is up to
the Haitian people themselves to dictate the terms of their future. In the meantime, it is important for the international
community to assist the reform process in a concrete way, but
also to celebrate the dedication of the Haitian lawyers who still
work today to institute a reform that is fundamental to rebuilding their country.

146. In 1990, 67% of the Haitian electorate elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide
to the presidency in Haiti’s first democratic election. Lisa McGowan, Haiti,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Jan. 1, 1997), http://www.fpif.org/reports/haiti.

